VoIP desk phones are trusted devices, but many are managed like office furniture. A newly disclosed flaw in Grandstream phones shows how a simple network-facing bug can turn a handset into an entry point for eavesdropping and wider access.
In a typical attack, the goal is not to break the phone or stop calls. The goal is to control where voice traffic goes, so sensitive conversations can be observed without obvious signs.
If an attacker already has malware on one system inside the network, a reachable phone can also become a quiet pivot that blends in with normal SIP traffic.
Rapid7 analysts noted CVE-2026-2329, describing it as a critical unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow in the Grandstream GXP1600 series that can be exploited to obtain root privileges.
In this attack users may still see a working screen and hear a dial tone while the device follows new instructions.
Treat this as a confidentiality issue as much as a device issue, because voice carries intent and strategy that rarely appears in logs.
Organizations with many handsets, call centers, and executive offices should review where these phones sit in the network and how they obtain configuration.
Even without a full exploit attempt, suspicious signs can include sudden configuration pushes, new SIP endpoints, repeated reboots, or calls that now traverse unfamiliar gateways.
Since the phones are often excluded from EDR coverage, network monitoring and change control are key for spotting misuse early.
| CVE ID | Severity (as described) | Vulnerability type | Attack vector / requirement | Primary impact | Affected devices | CVSS score | Fix / patched versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-2329 | Critical | Unauthenticated stack-based buffer overflow | Network-reachable exploitation; no authentication required | Root privileges on phone, SIP settings can be redirected for interception | Grandstream GXP1600 series VoIP phones | Not provided in the supplied source | Not stated in the supplied source; validate against vendor firmware advisories |
Silent interception mechanism
Once the attacker has root, they can change the phone’s SIP settings to route calls through an attacker-controlled proxy, enabling transparent interception while calls continue to function normally.
To reduce exposure, keep phone firmware current, remove direct internet reachability, and limit access to phone management interfaces to trusted admin networks.
Segment voice devices from user subnets, and monitor for unexpected SIP proxy or registrar changes that could redirect calls.
If patching is delayed, compensating controls like strict ACLs and internal-only VoIP routing can lower risk until updates are applied.
Where possible, centralize logs from PBX and SIP infrastructure, and alert on phones that start talking to new IPs or external DNS names.
A quick asset inventory of model and firmware versions will also help teams prioritize remediation and track progress.
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